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system of hypotheses

  • 1 система гипотез

    Русско-английский научно-технический словарь Масловского > система гипотез

  • 2 система гипотез

    1) Mathematics: system of hypotheses

    Универсальный русско-английский словарь > система гипотез

  • 3 Thinking

       But what then am I? A thing which thinks. What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels. (Descartes, 1951, p. 153)
       I have been trying in all this to remove the temptation to think that there "must be" a mental process of thinking, hoping, wishing, believing, etc., independent of the process of expressing a thought, a hope, a wish, etc.... If we scrutinize the usages which we make of "thinking," "meaning," "wishing," etc., going through this process rids us of the temptation to look for a peculiar act of thinking, independent of the act of expressing our thoughts, and stowed away in some particular medium. (Wittgenstein, 1958, pp. 41-43)
       Analyse the proofs employed by the subject. If they do not go beyond observation of empirical correspondences, they can be fully explained in terms of concrete operations, and nothing would warrant our assuming that more complex thought mechanisms are operating. If, on the other hand, the subject interprets a given correspondence as the result of any one of several possible combinations, and this leads him to verify his hypotheses by observing their consequences, we know that propositional operations are involved. (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, p. 279)
       In every age, philosophical thinking exploits some dominant concepts and makes its greatest headway in solving problems conceived in terms of them. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers construed knowledge, knower, and known in terms of sense data and their association. Descartes' self-examination gave classical psychology the mind and its contents as a starting point. Locke set up sensory immediacy as the new criterion of the real... Hobbes provided the genetic method of building up complex ideas from simple ones... and, in another quarter, still true to the Hobbesian method, Pavlov built intellect out of conditioned reflexes and Loeb built life out of tropisms. (S. Langer, 1962, p. 54)
       Experiments on deductive reasoning show that subjects are influenced sufficiently by their experience for their reasoning to differ from that described by a purely deductive system, whilst experiments on inductive reasoning lead to the view that an understanding of the strategies used by adult subjects in attaining concepts involves reference to higher-order concepts of a logical and deductive nature. (Bolton, 1972, p. 154)
       There are now machines in the world that think, that learn and create. Moreover, their ability to do these things is going to increase rapidly until-in the visible future-the range of problems they can handle will be coextensive with the range to which the human mind has been applied. (Newell & Simon, quoted in Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 138)
       But how does it happen that thinking is sometimes accompanied by action and sometimes not, sometimes by motion, and sometimes not? It looks as if almost the same thing happens as in the case of reasoning and making inferences about unchanging objects. But in that case the end is a speculative proposition... whereas here the conclusion which results from the two premises is an action.... I need covering; a cloak is a covering. I need a cloak. What I need, I have to make; I need a cloak. I have to make a cloak. And the conclusion, the "I have to make a cloak," is an action. (Nussbaum, 1978, p. 40)
       It is well to remember that when philosophy emerged in Greece in the sixth century, B.C., it did not burst suddenly out of the Mediterranean blue. The development of societies of reasoning creatures-what we call civilization-had been a process to be measured not in thousands but in millions of years. Human beings became civilized as they became reasonable, and for an animal to begin to reason and to learn how to improve its reasoning is a long, slow process. So thinking had been going on for ages before Greece-slowly improving itself, uncovering the pitfalls to be avoided by forethought, endeavoring to weigh alternative sets of consequences intellectually. What happened in the sixth century, B.C., is that thinking turned round on itself; people began to think about thinking, and the momentous event, the culmination of the long process to that point, was in fact the birth of philosophy. (Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan, 1980, p. xi)
       The way to look at thought is not to assume that there is a parallel thread of correlated affects or internal experiences that go with it in some regular way. It's not of course that people don't have internal experiences, of course they do; but that when you ask what is the state of mind of someone, say while he or she is performing a ritual, it's hard to believe that such experiences are the same for all people involved.... The thinking, and indeed the feeling in an odd sort of way, is really going on in public. They are really saying what they're saying, doing what they're doing, meaning what they're meaning. Thought is, in great part anyway, a public activity. (Geertz, quoted in J. Miller, 1983, pp. 202-203)
       Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. (Einstein, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 17)
       What, in effect, are the conditions for the construction of formal thought? The child must not only apply operations to objects-in other words, mentally execute possible actions on them-he must also "reflect" those operations in the absence of the objects which are replaced by pure propositions. Thus, "reflection" is thought raised to the second power. Concrete thinking is the representation of a possible action, and formal thinking is the representation of a representation of possible action.... It is not surprising, therefore, that the system of concrete operations must be completed during the last years of childhood before it can be "reflected" by formal operations. In terms of their function, formal operations do not differ from concrete operations except that they are applied to hypotheses or propositions [whose logic is] an abstract translation of the system of "inference" that governs concrete operations. (Piaget, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 237)
       [E]ven a human being today (hence, a fortiori, a remote ancestor of contemporary human beings) cannot easily or ordinarily maintain uninterrupted attention on a single problem for more than a few tens of seconds. Yet we work on problems that require vastly more time. The way we do that (as we can observe by watching ourselves) requires periods of mulling to be followed by periods of recapitulation, describing to ourselves what seems to have gone on during the mulling, leading to whatever intermediate results we have reached. This has an obvious function: namely, by rehearsing these interim results... we commit them to memory, for the immediate contents of the stream of consciousness are very quickly lost unless rehearsed.... Given language, we can describe to ourselves what seemed to occur during the mulling that led to a judgment, produce a rehearsable version of the reaching-a-judgment process, and commit that to long-term memory by in fact rehearsing it. (Margolis, 1987, p. 60)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Thinking

  • 4 gato de roca

    (n.) = meerkat
    Ex. Meerkats are an excellent model system to test hypotheses arising from the theory of evolution.
    * * *
    (n.) = meerkat

    Ex: Meerkats are an excellent model system to test hypotheses arising from the theory of evolution.

    Spanish-English dictionary > gato de roca

  • 5 posponer

    v.
    1 to put behind, to relegate.
    2 to postpone.
    María aparcó el proyecto Mary postponed the project.
    * * *
    Conjugation model [ PONER], like link=poner poner (pp pospuesto,-a)
    1 (en el tiempo) to postpone, delay, put off; (en el espacio) to put back, put in the background
    * * *
    verb
    * * *
    VT
    1) (=aplazar) to postpone
    2) (=subordinar)
    * * *
    verbo transitivo
    1) ( aplazar) to postpone, put off
    2) (Ling)

    se pospone al nombre — it comes after o follows the noun

    * * *
    = defer, move to + a time when, postpone, put off, put + aside, hold off.
    Ex. If the fund has not yet been assigned, entering a 'no' automatically defers the order.
    Ex. Because reorganisation allows the optimization of update and searching procedures, it moves the maintenance to a time when it does not affect the operation of the system.
    Ex. Since this will likely be a long meeting, I suggest we postpone approving the minutes of our last meeting.
    Ex. Thus the day for practical application of bibliographical hypotheses is continually being put off.
    Ex. The response to the user cannot be put aside until a better time.
    Ex. A dam at the Strait of Gibraltar could be constructed to limit the outflow and reverse the climate deterioration, thus holding off the next ice age.
    ----
    * posponer Algo = put + Nombre + on ice.
    * posponer una discusión = table + discussion.
    * * *
    verbo transitivo
    1) ( aplazar) to postpone, put off
    2) (Ling)

    se pospone al nombre — it comes after o follows the noun

    * * *
    = defer, move to + a time when, postpone, put off, put + aside, hold off.

    Ex: If the fund has not yet been assigned, entering a 'no' automatically defers the order.

    Ex: Because reorganisation allows the optimization of update and searching procedures, it moves the maintenance to a time when it does not affect the operation of the system.
    Ex: Since this will likely be a long meeting, I suggest we postpone approving the minutes of our last meeting.
    Ex: Thus the day for practical application of bibliographical hypotheses is continually being put off.
    Ex: The response to the user cannot be put aside until a better time.
    Ex: A dam at the Strait of Gibraltar could be constructed to limit the outflow and reverse the climate deterioration, thus holding off the next ice age.
    * posponer Algo = put + Nombre + on ice.
    * posponer una discusión = table + discussion.

    * * *
    vt
    A (aplazar) to postpone, put off
    tuvo que posponer el viaje she had to postpone o put off the trip
    B (relegar) posponer algo A algo:
    pospone la vida familiar al trabajo he puts his work before his family life
    C ( Ling):
    se pospone al nombre it comes after o follows the noun
    * * *

     

    posponer ( conjugate posponer) verbo transitivo ( aplazar) to postpone, put off
    posponer verbo transitivo
    1 (una decisión, un viaje) to postpone, put off
    2 (poner en segundo plano) to put in second place o behind
    ' posponer' also found in these entries:
    Spanish:
    dilatar
    - retardar
    - retrasar
    - dejar
    English:
    adjourn
    - delay
    - ice
    - put back
    - put off
    - postpone
    - put
    * * *
    1. [relegar] to put behind, to relegate
    2. [aplazar] to postpone;
    pospondremos la reunión para mañana we will postpone the meeting until tomorrow
    * * *
    <part pospuesto> v/t postpone
    * * *
    posponer {60} vt
    1) : to postpone
    2) : to put behind, to subordinate
    * * *
    posponer vb to postpone

    Spanish-English dictionary > posponer

  • 6 suricata

    Ex. Meerkats are an excellent model system to test hypotheses arising from the theory of evolution.
    * * *

    Ex: Meerkats are an excellent model system to test hypotheses arising from the theory of evolution.

    Spanish-English dictionary > suricata

  • 7 suricato

    m.
    suricate.
    * * *
    Ex. Meerkats are an excellent model system to test hypotheses arising from the theory of evolution.
    * * *

    Ex: Meerkats are an excellent model system to test hypotheses arising from the theory of evolution.

    * * *
    slender-tailed meerkat

    Spanish-English dictionary > suricato

  • 8 Philosophy

       And what I believe to be more important here is that I find in myself an infinity of ideas of certain things which cannot be assumed to be pure nothingness, even though they may have perhaps no existence outside of my thought. These things are not figments of my imagination, even though it is within my power to think of them or not to think of them; on the contrary, they have their own true and immutable natures. Thus, for example, when I imagine a triangle, even though there may perhaps be no such figure anywhere in the world outside of my thought, nor ever have been, nevertheless the figure cannot help having a certain determinate nature... or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented and which does not in any way depend upon my mind. (Descartes, 1951, p. 61)
       Let us console ourselves for not knowing the possible connections between a spider and the rings of Saturn, and continue to examine what is within our reach. (Voltaire, 1961, p. 144)
       As modern physics started with the Newtonian revolution, so modern philosophy starts with what one might call the Cartesian Catastrophe. The catastrophe consisted in the splitting up of the world into the realms of matter and mind, and the identification of "mind" with conscious thinking. The result of this identification was the shallow rationalism of l'esprit Cartesien, and an impoverishment of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy even in part. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)
       It has been made of late a reproach against natural philosophy that it has struck out on a path of its own, and has separated itself more and more widely from the other sciences which are united by common philological and historical studies. The opposition has, in fact, been long apparent, and seems to me to have grown up mainly under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, or, at any rate, to have been brought out into more distinct relief by that philosophy.... The sole object of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" was to test the sources and the authority of our knowledge, and to fix a definite scope and standard for the researches of philosophy, as compared with other sciences.... [But Hegel's] "Philosophy of Identity" was bolder. It started with the hypothesis that not only spiritual phenomena, but even the actual world-nature, that is, and man-were the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind, similar, it was supposed, in kind to the human mind.... The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic influences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect. (Helmholz, quoted in Dampier, 1966, pp. 291-292)
       Philosophy remains true to its classical tradition by renouncing it. (Habermas, 1972, p. 317)
       I have not attempted... to put forward any grand view of the nature of philosophy; nor do I have any such grand view to put forth if I would. It will be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the history of "howlers" and progress in philosophy as the debunking of howlers. It will also be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the enterprise of putting forward a priori truths about the world.... I see philosophy as a field which has certain central questions, for example, the relation between thought and reality.... It seems obvious that in dealing with these questions philosophers have formulated rival research programs, that they have put forward general hypotheses, and that philosophers within each major research program have modified their hypotheses by trial and error, even if they sometimes refuse to admit that that is what they are doing. To that extent philosophy is a "science." To argue about whether philosophy is a science in any more serious sense seems to me to be hardly a useful occupation.... It does not seem to me important to decide whether science is philosophy or philosophy is science as long as one has a conception of both that makes both essential to a responsible view of the world and of man's place in it. (Putnam, 1975, p. xvii)
       What can philosophy contribute to solving the problem of the relation [of] mind to body? Twenty years ago, many English-speaking philosophers would have answered: "Nothing beyond an analysis of the various mental concepts." If we seek knowledge of things, they thought, it is to science that we must turn. Philosophy can only cast light upon our concepts of those things.
       This retreat from things to concepts was not undertaken lightly. Ever since the seventeenth century, the great intellectual fact of our culture has been the incredible expansion of knowledge both in the natural and in the rational sciences (mathematics, logic).
       The success of science created a crisis in philosophy. What was there for philosophy to do? Hume had already perceived the problem in some degree, and so surely did Kant, but it was not until the twentieth century, with the Vienna Circle and with Wittgenstein, that the difficulty began to weigh heavily. Wittgenstein took the view that philosophy could do no more than strive to undo the intellectual knots it itself had tied, so achieving intellectual release, and even a certain illumination, but no knowledge. A little later, and more optimistically, Ryle saw a positive, if reduced role, for philosophy in mapping the "logical geography" of our concepts: how they stood to each other and how they were to be analyzed....
       Since that time, however, philosophers in the "analytic" tradition have swung back from Wittgensteinian and even Rylean pessimism to a more traditional conception of the proper role and tasks of philosophy. Many analytic philosophers now would accept the view that the central task of philosophy is to give an account, or at least play a part in giving an account, of the most general nature of things and of man. (Armstrong, 1990, pp. 37-38)
       8) Philosophy's Evolving Engagement with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science
       In the beginning, the nature of philosophy's engagement with artificial intelligence and cognitive science was clear enough. The new sciences of the mind were to provide the long-awaited vindication of the most potent dreams of naturalism and materialism. Mind would at last be located firmly within the natural order. We would see in detail how the most perplexing features of the mental realm could be supported by the operations of solely physical laws upon solely physical stuff. Mental causation (the power of, e.g., a belief to cause an action) would emerge as just another species of physical causation. Reasoning would be understood as a kind of automated theorem proving. And the key to both was to be the depiction of the brain as the implementation of multiple higher level programs whose task was to manipulate and transform symbols or representations: inner items with one foot in the physical (they were realized as brain states) and one in the mental (they were bearers of contents, and their physical gymnastics were cleverly designed to respect semantic relationships such as truth preservation). (A. Clark, 1996, p. 1)
       Socrates of Athens famously declared that "the unexamined life is not worth living," and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions the fundamental presuppositions of every area of human inquiry.... [P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together. Some philosophers have tried to incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic view of the nature of reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted system-building, and seen their primary role as one of clarifications, or the removal of obstacles along the road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using the human intellect to challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every aspect of human theory and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny....
       Philosophy is, of course, part of a continuing tradition, and there is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated and developed. But the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not to pay homage to past genius, but to enrich one's understanding of central problems that are as pressing today as they have always been-problems about knowledge, truth and reality, the nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to live. These questions help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic discipline, but in a wider sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely continue to be with us for as long as humanity endures. (Cottingham, 1996, pp. xxi-xxii)
       In his study of ancient Greek culture, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche drew what would become a famous distinction, between the Dionysian spirit, the untamed spirit of art and creativity, and the Apollonian, that of reason and self-control. The story of Greek civilization, and all civilizations, Nietzsche implied, was the gradual victory of Apollonian man, with his desire for control over nature and himself, over Dionysian man, who survives only in myth, poetry, music, and drama. Socrates and Plato had attacked the illusions of art as unreal, and had overturned the delicate cultural balance by valuing only man's critical, rational, and controlling consciousness while denigrating his vital life instincts as irrational and base. The result of this division is "Alexandrian man," the civilized and accomplished Greek citizen of the later ancient world, who is "equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge" but in whom the wellsprings of creativity have dried up. (Herman, 1997, pp. 95-96)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Philosophy

  • 9 Artificial Intelligence

       In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)
       Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)
       Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....
       When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)
       4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually
       Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)
       What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)
       The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)
       9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form
       The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)
       There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:
        Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."
        Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)
       Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)
       Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)
       The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)
        14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation
       It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)
       We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.
       Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.
       Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.
    ... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)
       Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)
        16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts
       Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)
       Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System
       Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence
       The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.
       The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)
       The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....
       AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)
        21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions
       In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)
       Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)
       Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)
       The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence

  • 10 barajar

    v.
    1 to shuffle (cards).
    María baraja las cartas Mary shuffles the cards.
    2 to consider.
    3 to give consideration to.
    María barajó el asunto Mary gave consideration to the issue.
    4 to explain.
    * * *
    1 (naipes) to shuffle
    3 (problema) to solve; (obstáculo) to overcome
    * * *
    verb
    * * *
    1. VT
    1) [+ cartas] to shuffle
    2) (=considerar) [+ nombres, candidatos] to consider, weigh up

    se baraja la posibilidad de que... — the possibility that... is being weighed up o considered, there is discussion about the possibility that...

    3) (=mezclar) to jumble up, mix up
    4) Cono Sur, Méx [+ asunto] (=confundir) to confuse; (=demorar) to delay
    5) Cono Sur (=ofrecer) to pass round, hand round
    6) Cono Sur (=agarrar) to catch ( in the air)
    2.
    VI to quarrel, squabble
    3.
    See:
    * * *
    verbo transitivo
    1) < cartas> to shuffle
    2) <nombres/posibilidades> to consider, look at; < cifras> to talk about, mention
    3)
    a) (Col, Méx, Ven fam) ( explicar) to explain

    barájamela más despacio — explain it o (colloq) give it to me more slowly

    b) (Col fam) ( enredar)
    * * *
    Ex. Libraries are looking towards some sort of cooperative system.
    ----
    * barajar la posibilidad = entertain + the possibility.
    * barajar nombres = bandy + names.
    * * *
    verbo transitivo
    1) < cartas> to shuffle
    2) <nombres/posibilidades> to consider, look at; < cifras> to talk about, mention
    3)
    a) (Col, Méx, Ven fam) ( explicar) to explain

    barájamela más despacio — explain it o (colloq) give it to me more slowly

    b) (Col fam) ( enredar)
    * * *

    Ex: Libraries are looking towards some sort of cooperative system.

    * barajar la posibilidad = entertain + the possibility.
    * barajar nombres = bandy + names.

    * * *
    barajar [A1 ]
    vt
    A ‹cartas› to shuffle
    B ‹nombres/posibilidades›
    se barajaron varias posibilidades/diversas hipótesis several possibilities/various hypotheses were considered
    estamos barajando varias ideas acerca de la forma de hacer el libro we are looking at o toying with o considering various ways of doing the book
    las cifras que se barajan son las de 144 aviones y 22 barcos the figures being talked about o mentioned are 144 airplanes and 22 ships
    C
    1 (Col, Méx fam) (explicar) to explain
    barájamela más despacio explain it o ( colloq) give it to me more slowly
    2
    ( Col fam) (enredar): el nuevo jefe le barajó la vida his new boss made life very complicated for him
    el nacimiento del bebé les barajó la vida the birth of the baby turned their life upside down
    D ( Chi) ‹golpe› to parry, block; ‹balón› to stop
    barajárselas ( Chi fam); to get by
    ■ barajar
    vi
    to quarrel
    * * *

    barajar ( conjugate barajar) verbo transitivo
    1 ‹ cartas› to shuffle
    2 ‹nombres/posibilidades› to consider, look at;
    ‹ cifras› to talk about, mention
    barajar verbo transitivo
    1 (los naipes) to shuffle
    2 fig (considerar distintas posibilidades) to consider, juggle with
    ' barajar' also found in these entries:
    English:
    shuffle
    * * *
    1. [cartas] to shuffle;
    2. [posibilidades] to consider;
    la policía baraja tres teorías diferentes the police are looking at o considering three different theories;
    se barajan varios nombres para el puesto various names are being mentioned in connection with the post
    3. Chile [golpe] to parry
    4. RP Fam [agarrar] to grab, to snatch;
    barajé la taza a pocos centímetros del piso I grabbed the cup just before it hit the floor
    * * *
    I v/t
    1 naipes shuffle
    2 fig
    consider
    II v/i quarrel
    * * *
    1) : to shuffle (cards)
    2) : to consider, to toy with
    * * *
    barajar vb (naipes) to shuffle

    Spanish-English dictionary > barajar

  • 11 igualmente

    adv.
    1 also, likewise (also).
    2 the same to you, likewise.
    3 equally, alike, too, as well.
    intj.
    1 just the same.
    2 the same to you.
    * * *
    ■ es igualmente usual que... it is just as usual that...
    2 (también) likewise; (a pesar de ello) all the same, still
    ■ se refirió igualmente a... he also referred to...
    3 (como respuesta) the same to you
    ■ ¡que haya suerte! --¡igualmente! good luck! --the same to you!
    * * *
    adv.
    * * *
    ADV
    1) (=del mismo modo) equally

    todos mis estudiantes son igualmente vagos — all my students are equally lazy, my students are all as lazy as each other

    aunque se lo prohíbas, lo hará igualmente — even if you tell him not to, he'll do it anyway o just the same

    2) (=también) likewise

    igualmente, los pensionistas quedan exentos — likewise, pensioners are exempt

    3) [en saludo] likewise, the same to you

    -¡Feliz Navidad! -gracias, igualmente — "Happy Christmas!" - "thanks, likewise o the same to you"

    -muchos recuerdos a tus padres -gracias, igualmente — "give my regards to your parents" - "I will, and to yours too"

    4) (=uniformemente) evenly
    * * *

    saludos a tu mujer - gracias, igualmente — give my regards to your wife - thanks, and to yours (too)

    b) <bueno/malo> equally
    c) (frml) ( también) likewise
    * * *
    = as well, for that matter, likewise, similarly, correspondingly, equally, just as importantly, equally importantly, as importantly, so too, in like manner, in a like manner, in like fashion, same here, me too, in like vein.
    Ex. Again, the following statement is appropriate: A is permitted, but consider B or C or... N, as well or instead.
    Ex. A machine-readable national data base, or for that matter any catalog, should be capable of existing in time.
    Ex. 'Bearings' are part of the Key system 'Dynamos', and thus may be denoted by (p), thus (p) Bearings and likewise (p) Diameter.
    Ex. Thus the electronic journal (e-journal) is a concept where scientists are able to input ideas and text to a computer data base for their colleagues to view, and similarly to view the work of others.
    Ex. For supercomputers the number of sales is at a much lower level, but the unit prices are correspondingly higher.
    Ex. Porous Bavarian limestone was used as this absorbs grease and water equally.
    Ex. And, just as importantly, computers have assumed an increasingly pervasive role in industrial automation.
    Ex. Equally importantly, it strives to reflect the latest developments in the field of cooperative activities.
    Ex. As importantly, I also want to look at the medium term management problems relating to the delivery of digital libraries.
    Ex. Quality is important but so too is hard statistical evidence of the library's productivity.
    Ex. In like manner, new books do not generally replace old ones in libraries.
    Ex. The author suggests that certain types of people are attracted to certain occupations, and that people who choose the same occupation tend to behave in a like manner within their occupational group.
    Ex. Since Michigan's pioneering move, two other schools have re-baptized themselves in like fashion.
    Ex. Same here. I mean, I personally think that there is some divine power somewhere.
    Ex. Unfortunately, this approach results mostly in ' me too' behavior and very little that's new.
    Ex. Other old crones added their ribaldries in like vein, amusing everyone but the young couple.
    * * *

    saludos a tu mujer - gracias, igualmente — give my regards to your wife - thanks, and to yours (too)

    b) <bueno/malo> equally
    c) (frml) ( también) likewise
    * * *
    = as well, for that matter, likewise, similarly, correspondingly, equally, just as importantly, equally importantly, as importantly, so too, in like manner, in a like manner, in like fashion, same here, me too, in like vein.

    Ex: Again, the following statement is appropriate: A is permitted, but consider B or C or... N, as well or instead.

    Ex: A machine-readable national data base, or for that matter any catalog, should be capable of existing in time.
    Ex: 'Bearings' are part of the Key system 'Dynamos', and thus may be denoted by (p), thus (p) Bearings and likewise (p) Diameter.
    Ex: Thus the electronic journal (e-journal) is a concept where scientists are able to input ideas and text to a computer data base for their colleagues to view, and similarly to view the work of others.
    Ex: For supercomputers the number of sales is at a much lower level, but the unit prices are correspondingly higher.
    Ex: Porous Bavarian limestone was used as this absorbs grease and water equally.
    Ex: And, just as importantly, computers have assumed an increasingly pervasive role in industrial automation.
    Ex: Equally importantly, it strives to reflect the latest developments in the field of cooperative activities.
    Ex: As importantly, I also want to look at the medium term management problems relating to the delivery of digital libraries.
    Ex: Quality is important but so too is hard statistical evidence of the library's productivity.
    Ex: In like manner, new books do not generally replace old ones in libraries.
    Ex: The author suggests that certain types of people are attracted to certain occupations, and that people who choose the same occupation tend to behave in a like manner within their occupational group.
    Ex: Since Michigan's pioneering move, two other schools have re-baptized themselves in like fashion.
    Ex: Same here. I mean, I personally think that there is some divine power somewhere.
    Ex: Unfortunately, this approach results mostly in ' me too' behavior and very little that's new.
    Ex: Other old crones added their ribaldries in like vein, amusing everyone but the young couple.

    * * *
    A
    (en fórmulas de cortesía): que lo pases muy bien — igualmente have a great time — you too o and you
    saludos a tu mujer — gracias, igualmente give my regards to your wife — thanks, and to yours (too)
    feliz Año Nuevo — gracias, igualmente Happy New Year — thanks, the same to you
    B ‹bueno/malo› equally
    hay cinco candidatos, todos igualmente malos there are five candidates, all equally bad o all as bad as each other
    C ( frml) (también) likewise
    * * *

     

    igualmente adverbio

    ◊ que lo pases muy bien — igualmente have a great time — you too o and you

    b) ‹bueno/malo› equally

    c) (frml) ( también) likewise

    igualmente adverbio
    1 (por igual) equally: las dos hipótesis son igualmente probables, the two hypotheses are equally possible
    2 (del mismo modo, lo mismo digo) fam ¡estás preciosa! - ¡igualmente!, you look great!- you too!
    ¡gracias! - ¡igualmente!, thank you! - the same to you!
    3 (también) also, likewise: ... el siguiente caso es igualmente incurable,... the next case is also incurable
    ' igualmente' also found in these entries:
    Spanish:
    ver
    - asimismo
    English:
    alike
    - equally
    - same
    - similarly
    * * *
    1. [de manera igual] equally;
    la riqueza no está repartida igualmente wealth is not distributed equally;
    dos proyectos igualmente importantes two equally important projects
    2. [también] also, likewise;
    ofreció igualmente dar asilo a los refugiados he also o likewise offered to grant the refugees asylum;
    igualmente, querría recordar a nuestro querido maestro I would also like us to remember our much-loved teacher
    3. [fórmula de cortesía]
    que pases un buen fin de semana – igualmente have a good weekend – you too;
    que aproveche – igualmente enjoy your meal – you too;
    ¡Feliz Navidad! – igualmente Merry Christmas! – same to you!;
    encantado de conocerlo – igualmente pleased to meet you – likewise;
    recuerdos a tu madre – gracias, igualmente give my regards to your mother – thanks, give mine to yours too
    * * *
    adv equally
    * * *
    1) : equally
    2) asimismo: likewise
    * * *
    igualmente1 adv equally
    igualmente2 interj the same to you! / you too!
    ¡que vaya bien! ¡Igualmente! all the best! The same to you!

    Spanish-English dictionary > igualmente

  • 12 Mind

       It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science... to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder in which they lie involved when made the object of reflection and inquiry.... It cannot be doubted that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these powers are distinct from one another, and that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by reflection and, consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood which lie not beyond the compass of human understanding. (Hume, 1955, p. 22)
       Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any Ideas: How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from Experience. (Locke, quoted in Herrnstein & Boring, 1965, p. 584)
       The kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern science, and... the difference lies, not in the quality of the intellectual process, but in the nature of things to which it is applied.... Man has always been thinking equally well; the improvement lies, not in an alleged progress of man's mind, but in the discovery of new areas to which it may apply its unchanged and unchanging powers. (Leґvi-Strauss, 1963, p. 230)
       MIND. A mysterious form of matter secreted by the brain. Its chief activity consists in the endeavor to ascertain its own nature, the futility of the attempt being due to the fact that it has nothing but itself to know itself with. (Bierce, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 55)
       [Philosophy] understands the foundations of knowledge and it finds these foundations in a study of man-as-knower, of the "mental processes" or the "activity of representation" which make knowledge possible. To know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind, so to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representation.... We owe the notion of a "theory of knowledge" based on an understanding of "mental processes" to the seventeenth century, and especially to Locke. We owe the notion of "the mind" as a separate entity in which "processes" occur to the same period, and especially to Descartes. We owe the notion of philosophy as a tribunal of pure reason, upholding or denying the claims of the rest of culture, to the eighteenth century and especially to Kant, but this Kantian notion presupposed general assent to Lockean notions of mental processes and Cartesian notions of mental substance. (Rorty, 1979, pp. 3-4)
       Under pressure from the computer, the question of mind in relation to machine is becoming a central cultural preoccupation. It is becoming for us what sex was to Victorians-threat, obsession, taboo, and fascination. (Turkle, 1984, p. 313)
       7) Understanding the Mind Remains as Resistant to Neurological as to Cognitive Analyses
       Recent years have been exciting for researchers in the brain and cognitive sciences. Both fields have flourished, each spurred on by methodological and conceptual developments, and although understanding the mechanisms of mind is an objective shared by many workers in these areas, their theories and approaches to the problem are vastly different....
       Early experimental psychologists, such as Wundt and James, were as interested in and knowledgeable about the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system as about the young science of the mind. However, the experimental study of mental processes was short-lived, being eclipsed by the rise of behaviorism early in this century. It was not until the late 1950s that the signs of a new mentalism first appeared in scattered writings of linguists, philosophers, computer enthusiasts, and psychologists.
       In this new incarnation, the science of mind had a specific mission: to challenge and replace behaviorism. In the meantime, brain science had in many ways become allied with a behaviorist approach.... While behaviorism sought to reduce the mind to statements about bodily action, brain science seeks to explain the mind in terms of physiochemical events occurring in the nervous system. These approaches contrast with contemporary cognitive science, which tries to understand the mind as it is, without any reduction, a view sometimes described as functionalism.
       The cognitive revolution is now in place. Cognition is the subject of contemporary psychology. This was achieved with little or no talk of neurons, action potentials, and neurotransmitters. Similarly, neuroscience has risen to an esteemed position among the biological sciences without much talk of cognitive processes. Do the fields need each other?... [Y]es because the problem of understanding the mind, unlike the wouldbe problem solvers, respects no disciplinary boundaries. It remains as resistant to neurological as to cognitive analyses. (LeDoux & Hirst, 1986, pp. 1-2)
       Since the Second World War scientists from different disciplines have turned to the study of the human mind. Computer scientists have tried to emulate its capacity for visual perception. Linguists have struggled with the puzzle of how children acquire language. Ethologists have sought the innate roots of social behaviour. Neurophysiologists have begun to relate the function of nerve cells to complex perceptual and motor processes. Neurologists and neuropsychologists have used the pattern of competence and incompetence of their brain-damaged patients to elucidate the normal workings of the brain. Anthropologists have examined the conceptual structure of cultural practices to advance hypotheses about the basic principles of the mind. These days one meets engineers who work on speech perception, biologists who investigate the mental representation of spatial relations, and physicists who want to understand consciousness. And, of course, psychologists continue to study perception, memory, thought and action.
    ... [W]orkers in many disciplines have converged on a number of central problems and explanatory ideas. They have realized that no single approach is likely to unravel the workings of the mind: it will not give up its secrets to psychology alone; nor is any other isolated discipline-artificial intelligence, linguistics, anthropology, neurophysiology, philosophy-going to have any greater success. (Johnson-Laird, 1988, p. 7)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Mind

  • 13 учение

    1) General subject: apprenticeship, doctrine, dogma, drill, drill-machine, (строевое) drilling, exercise, instruction, learning, study, teaching, school, school of thought
    3) Engineering: science, theory, training
    4) Religion: teachings
    5) Economy: system
    6) Accounting: studies
    7) Scornful: ism
    8) Psychology: dharma
    9) Scottish language: lear
    10) Sakhalin energy glossary: exercise (Oil Spill Response exercise)
    11) Psychoanalysis: fortuitism, temporalism
    12) Makarov: apprenticeship (ремеслу), hypotheses, hypothesis, teaching (теория), theory (теория)
    13) Taboo: muging up

    Универсальный русско-английский словарь > учение

  • 14 νέμω

    Grammatical information: v.
    Meaning: `deal out, dispense, distribute (among themselves, possess, inhabit, manage, pasture, consume, devour'.
    Other forms: - ομαι, aor. νεῖμαι (Il.), - ασθαι, pass. νεμηθῆναι, fut. νεμῶ, - οῦμαι (Ion. - έομαι, late - ήσω, - ήσομαι), perf. νενέμηκα,- ημαι (Att. etc.).
    Compounds: Often w. prefix, e.g. ἀπο-, ἐπι-, κατα-, προσ-.
    Derivatives: Several derivv: A. νομή f. `pasture', metaph. `spreading', e.g. of an ulcer, `distribution' (IA.), `possession, possessio' (hell.). With ἐπι-, προ-νομή etc. from ἐπι-, προ-νέμειν, - εσθαι etc. Also νομός m. `*place of) pasture' (Il.), `habitation' (Pi., Hdt., S.), `province' (Hdt., D. S., Str.). From νομή or νομός (not always with certainty to be distinguished): 1. νομάς, - άδος `roaming the pasture', subst. pl. `pastoral people, nomads' (IA.), as PN `Numidians' (Plb.); from this νομαδ-ικός `roaming, belonging to pastoral peoples, Numidian' (Arist.), - ίτης `id.' (Suid.), - ίαι f. pl. `pasture' with - ιαῖος (Peripl. M. Rubr.). -- 2. νομεύς m. `herdsman' (II.), also `distributor' (Pl.), pl. `ribs of a ship' (Hdt.); from this (or from νομός?) νομεύω `pasture' (Il.) with νόμευ-μα n. `herd' (A.), - τικός `belonging to pasturage' (Pl.; Chantraine Études 135 u. 137); διανομ-εύς (: διανομή), προνομ-εύω (: προ-νομή) etc. -- 3. νόμιος `regarding the pasture', also as adjunct of several gods (Pi., Ar., Call.); cf. on νόμος; νομαῖος `id.' (Nic., Call.); νομώδης `spreading', of an ulcer (medic.). -- 4. νομάζω, - ομαι `pasture' (Nic.). -- B. νόμος m. `custom, usage, law, composition' (since Hes.) with several compp., e.g. Ἔννομος PN (Il.), εὔ-νομος `with good laws' (Pi.) with εὑνομ-ίη, - ία `good laws' (since ρ 487; on the meaning Andrewes Class Quart. 32, 89 ff.). From νόμος: 1. adj. νόμιμος `usual, lawful' (IA.; extens. Arbenz 72ff.) with νομιμότης f. (Iamb.); νομικός `regarding the laws, forensic, lawyer' (Pl., Arist.; Chantraine Études 132); νόμαιος = νόμιμος (Ion. a. late); νόμιος `id.' (Locris; cf. on νομός). -- 2. Verb νομίζω, rarely w. prefix, e.g. συν-, κατα-, `use customarily, use to, recognize, believe' (IA., Dor.; Fournier Les verbes "dire" passim) with νόμισις f. `belief' (Th.), νόμισμα n. `use, recognized belief, (valid) coin' (IA.), - άτιον dimin. (Poll.); νομιστός `generally recognized' with νομιστεύομαι `be generally valid' (Plb.), also νομιτεύομαι `id., use' (hell. a. late inscr.; cf. θεμι(σ)-τεύω). -- C. νεμέτωρ, - ορος m. `dispensor (of justice), avenger' (A. Th. 485); νέμησις f., also ἀπο-, δια-, ἐπι- etc. from ἀπο-νέμω etc., `distribution' (Is., Arist.); νεμ-ητής = νεμέτωρ (Poll.) with - ήτρια f. (inscr. Rom, IVp); uncertain Νεμήϊος surname of Zeus (Archyt. ap. Stob.); perh. for Νέμειος (from Νεμέα). On νέμεσις s. v. -- D. Deverbatives: νεμέθω, - ομαι `pasture' (Λ 635, Nic.); νωμάω, - ῆσαι also with ἐπι-, ἀμφι-, προσ-, `distribute, maintain, observe' (Il., Hdt.; Schwyzer 719, Risch Gnomon 24, 82) with νώμ-ησις (Pl. Cra. 41 1d), - ήτωρ `distributor, maintainer etc.' (Man., Nonn.).
    Origin: IE [Indo-European] [763] * nem- `dispense, distribute; take'
    Etymology: The whole Greek system including ablauting νομή, νόμος, νομός is built on the present νέμω. The full grade νεμέ-τωρ, νέμε-σις, νέμη-σις a.o. follow wellknown patterns ( γενέ-τωρ γένε-σις u.a.; but these are disyllabic roots); an agreeing zero grade fails. There never existed a "disyllabic root" e.g. Fraenkel Nom. ag. 2, 11). -- The widespread meanings of νέμω plus derivations provide a problem, which has hardly been definitely solved; Benveniste Noms d'agent 79 rightly stresses the idea of lawfull, regular, which characterizes the verb νέμω ("partager légalement, faire une attribution régulière"). Further lit.: E. Laroche Histoire de la racine nem- en grec ancien (Paris 1949; Études et Comm.VI); on νόμος esp. Stier Phil. 83, 224ff., Pohlenz Phil. 97, 135ff., Porzig Satzinhalte 260, Bolelli Stud. itfilcl. N.S.24, 110f.; on νομή, - ός Wilhelm Glotta 24, 133ff. (ἐν χειρῶν νομῳ̃, - αῖς). -- Of non-Greek words, that are interesting for the etymology, the Germanic verb for `take' agrees best to νέμω, Goth. niman etc.; further Latv. ńęmu, ńem̂t `take' (with secondary palatalisation of the anlaut). One might mention several nouns, which tell nothing for Greek: Av. nǝmah- n. `loan', Lat. numerus `number etc.', OIr. nem f. `gift' (cf. Gift: geben; also δόσις), Lith. nùoma f. `rent' (vowel as in νω-μάω). -- The with νέμω also formally identical verb Skt. námati `bow, bend' can only be combined with uncontrollable hypotheses. After Laroche (s. above) p. 263 νέμω would prop be. `faire le geste de se pencher en tendant la main'. -- Lit. and further details in WP. 2, 330f., Pok. 763 f., W.-Hofmann s. numerus and nummus (from νόμιμος?), also emō, Fraenkel Wb. s. núoma(s), and nãmas, Mayrhofer s. námati. Cf. also νέμος.
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    Greek-English etymological dictionary (Ελληνικά-Αγγλικά ετυμολογική λεξικό) > νέμω

  • 15 σβέννυμι

    Grammatical information: v.
    Meaning: `quench, to extinguish, to be extinguished, extinct (IA.).
    Other forms: - ύω (Pi., Hp. a. o.), aor. σβέσ(σ)αι (Il.), pass. σβεσθῆναι (IA.), fut. σβέσω (A., E. a. o.); midd. σβέννυμαι (Hes.), aor. σβῆναι (Il.), fut. σβήσομαι (Pl. a. o.), perf. ἔσβηκα (A.), ἔσβεσμαι (Parm. a.o.).
    Compounds: Also w. prefix, esp. ἀπο- and κατα- (on the use in Hom. Graz Le feu dans l'Il. et l'Od.259ff.).
    Derivatives: σβέ-σις ( ἀπό-, κατά- σβέννυμι) f. `extinction, putting out' (Arist. etc.), σβεσ-τήρ, - τῆρος m. `extinguisher' (Plu.; not quite certain), - τήριος `useful for extinguishing' (Th. etc.), - τικός `id.' (Arist. etc.); ἄ-σβεσ-τος `unextinguishable' (Hom. a.o.; σβεστός Nonn.), f. (sc. τίτανος) `unslaked lime' (Dsc., Plu. a. o.) with ἀσβεστ-ήριοι and - ωσις H. as explanation of κονιαταί resp. κονίασις. -- Deviating the aor. κατα-σβῶσαι (Herod.). -- Besides some H.glossen: ζείναμεν (- υμεν?) σβέννυμεν, ἐζίνα (for - είν-) ἐπεσβέννυεν, ἀποζίννυται (cod. - ξ-; for - ζείν-) ἀποσβέννυται; ζόασον σβέσον; ζοάσ\< εις\> σ[ε]βέσεις.
    Origin: IE [Indo-European] [479] * (s)gʷes- `extinguish'
    Etymology: The above formal system is as a whole built on the root σβεσ- in σβέσ-σαι and ἄ-σβεσ-τος. To the aorist σβέσ(σ)αι joined σβέννυμι from *σβέσ-νυ-μι (on the phonetics Schwyzer 697), σβέσω, σβεσθῆναι, ἔσβεσμαι. To this came as innovation ἔσβην, σβῆναι (after ἔστην, ἐκάην, ἐάγην etc.), to which came σβήσομαι, ἔσβηκα. On itself stands κατα-σβῶσαι, which may have an old lengthened grade (cf. below), but which can also with ζόασον, ζοάσεις (s. ab.) be understood as an iterativ (from *σβοῆσαι) of uncertain date. Cf. (with partly diff. view) Schwyzer 719 and 743 w. n. 1. From the byforms with ζ-, ζείναμεν etc., one can conclude for σβέσ(σ)αι, σβέννυμι to an IE * sgʷes-, which cannot be separated from other verbs for `extinguish': Lith. gęs-tù, gès-ti `extinguish, die out', caus. ges-aũ, -ýti `extinguish', Slav., e.g. OCS u-gašǫ, u-gasiti `extinguish' (IE * gʷōs-; also in - σβῶσαι?; s. ab.), Toch. AB käs- `extinguish'; prob. also Skt. jásate `is extinguished', jāsayati `exhaust'. Hitt. kišt-'be extinguished, perish' (e.g. 3. sg. kištari) is however incompatable with the labiovelar in σβέννυμι. If we posit a pure velar g, which is possible for all other languages, σβέννυμαι must be separated. -- Through the initial σ- Greek is distinguished from its cognates. Prob. it concerns a prefix (after Prellwitz s. v. a mutilated ἐξ-). Diff. Brugmann (e.g. Grundr.2 I 590) and Schwyzer 743 n. 1 (to be rejected). -- Further forms from the diff. languages with uncertain hypotheses and older lit. in Bq and WP. 1, 693f. (Pok. 479f.); s. also Fraenkel Wb. s. gèsti, Vasmer s. gasítь, W.-Hofmann s. sēgnis.
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  • 16 σφάζω

    Grammatical information: v.
    Meaning: `to slaughter (by cutting the throat), to kill, to sacrifice' (Il.).
    Other forms: - άττω (young-Att., anal. [Schwyzer 715]), - άδδω (Boeot.), aor. σφάξαι (Il.), pass. σφαγῆναι (IA. etc.), - χθῆναι (Pi., Hdt., E. in lyr. a.o.), fut. σφάξω (E. a.o.), pass. - γήσομαι (Att.), perf. midd. ἔσφαγμαι (Od.), act. ἔσφακα (late).
    Compounds: Often w. prefix, esp. ἀπο-, ἐπι-, κατα-.
    Derivatives: 1. σφαγ-ή ( δια-, κατα-) f. `slaughter, killing; throat' (trag., Att. prose etc.) with - ῖτις ( φλέψ) `belonging to the throat (to the slaughter?)' (medic., Arist.; Redard 102), - εύς m. `slaughterer, sacrificial knife' (S., E., decrees ap. And., D. a.o.; Bosshardt 41). 2. - ιος `belonging to the slaughter, killing' (Hp., S. in lyr. a.o.); - ιον ( προ-), -mostly pl. - ια n. `victim, oblation, esp. before a battle' (IA.; Eitrem Symb. Oslo. 18,9ff.) with - ιάζομαι, - ιάζω `to slaughter, to sacrifice' (IA.), - ιασμός m. (E. in lyr., Plu. a.o.). 3. - ίς f. `slaughter-knife, sacrificial knife' (E. a.o.; also referring to σφαγή, Chantraine Form. 338) with - ίδιον (Suid.); but ἐπι-σφαγ-ίς `nape of the neck, where the axe strikes' and παρα-σφαγ-ίς `part next to the throat' (Poll.) Hypostases of σφαγή. 4. - εῖον n. `slaughtering-bowl, sacrificial bowl' (A., E., Ar., inscr.; from σφαγ-ή or - εύς?, cf. ἱερεῖον; on - ιον, - εῖον Schwyzer 470). 5. - ιστήριον = - εῖον (sch.). 6. σφάγμα n. `the killing' (sch.), futher only to the prefixed verbs, e.g. πρόσφαγ-μα (A., E. a.o.). 7. σφάκ-της m. `murderer' (late), in compp., e.g. καλαμο- σφάζω `one who kills with a pin' (Ph.), with - τικη μάχαιρα (Zonar.) 8. - τήρ m. `id.', only δια- σφάζω, χιμαρο- σφάζω (AP), - τρια f. `sacrificial priestess' (Ael.). 9. - τρον n. `sacrificial tax' (Palmyra IIp, Poll.). 10. - σφάξ, e.g. δια-σφάξ, - άγος f. `rip, split, chasm' (Hdt. a.o.). 11. - σφαγ-ία f., e.g. βοο- σφάζω `the killing of oxen' ( APl.).
    Origin: PG [a word of Pre-Greek origin]X [probably]
    Etymology: The above regular system can be without difficulty be understood as a Greek creation from a primary verb σφάζω, σφάξαι or a noun σφαγ-. -- No agreement outside Greek. Untenable hypotheses are mentioned by Bq and WP. 2, 653 (after Prellwitz and Persson), also in Hofmann Et. Wb. (to Arm. spananem `kill'). Cf. φάσγανον. -- Furnée 300 connects φάσγανον as φασγ-\/ σφαγ-; hard to consider as certain.
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    Greek-English etymological dictionary (Ελληνικά-Αγγλικά ετυμολογική λεξικό) > σφάζω

  • 17 Computers

       The brain has been compared to a digital computer because the neuron, like a switch or valve, either does or does not complete a circuit. But at that point the similarity ends. The switch in the digital computer is constant in its effect, and its effect is large in proportion to the total output of the machine. The effect produced by the neuron varies with its recovery from [the] refractory phase and with its metabolic state. The number of neurons involved in any action runs into millions so that the influence of any one is negligible.... Any cell in the system can be dispensed with.... The brain is an analogical machine, not digital. Analysis of the integrative activities will probably have to be in statistical terms. (Lashley, quoted in Beach, Hebb, Morgan & Nissen, 1960, p. 539)
       It is essential to realize that a computer is not a mere "number cruncher," or supercalculating arithmetic machine, although this is how computers are commonly regarded by people having no familiarity with artificial intelligence. Computers do not crunch numbers; they manipulate symbols.... Digital computers originally developed with mathematical problems in mind, are in fact general purpose symbol manipulating machines....
       The terms "computer" and "computation" are themselves unfortunate, in view of their misleading arithmetical connotations. The definition of artificial intelligence previously cited-"the study of intelligence as computation"-does not imply that intelligence is really counting. Intelligence may be defined as the ability creatively to manipulate symbols, or process information, given the requirements of the task in hand. (Boden, 1981, pp. 15, 16-17)
       The task is to get computers to explain things to themselves, to ask questions about their experiences so as to cause those explanations to be forthcoming, and to be creative in coming up with explanations that have not been previously available. (Schank, 1986, p. 19)
       In What Computers Can't Do, written in 1969 (2nd edition, 1972), the main objection to AI was the impossibility of using rules to select only those facts about the real world that were relevant in a given situation. The "Introduction" to the paperback edition of the book, published by Harper & Row in 1979, pointed out further that no one had the slightest idea how to represent the common sense understanding possessed even by a four-year-old. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 102)
       A popular myth says that the invention of the computer diminishes our sense of ourselves, because it shows that rational thought is not special to human beings, but can be carried on by a mere machine. It is a short stop from there to the conclusion that intelligence is mechanical, which many people find to be an affront to all that is most precious and singular about their humanness.
       In fact, the computer, early in its career, was not an instrument of the philistines, but a humanizing influence. It helped to revive an idea that had fallen into disrepute: the idea that the mind is real, that it has an inner structure and a complex organization, and can be understood in scientific terms. For some three decades, until the 1940s, American psychology had lain in the grip of the ice age of behaviorism, which was antimental through and through. During these years, extreme behaviorists banished the study of thought from their agenda. Mind and consciousness, thinking, imagining, planning, solving problems, were dismissed as worthless for anything except speculation. Only the external aspects of behavior, the surface manifestations, were grist for the scientist's mill, because only they could be observed and measured....
       It is one of the surprising gifts of the computer in the history of ideas that it played a part in giving back to psychology what it had lost, which was nothing less than the mind itself. In particular, there was a revival of interest in how the mind represents the world internally to itself, by means of knowledge structures such as ideas, symbols, images, and inner narratives, all of which had been consigned to the realm of mysticism. (Campbell, 1989, p. 10)
       [Our artifacts] only have meaning because we give it to them; their intentionality, like that of smoke signals and writing, is essentially borrowed, hence derivative. To put it bluntly: computers themselves don't mean anything by their tokens (any more than books do)-they only mean what we say they do. Genuine understanding, on the other hand, is intentional "in its own right" and not derivatively from something else. (Haugeland, 1981a, pp. 32-33)
       he debate over the possibility of computer thought will never be won or lost; it will simply cease to be of interest, like the previous debate over man as a clockwork mechanism. (Bolter, 1984, p. 190)
       t takes us a long time to emotionally digest a new idea. The computer is too big a step, and too recently made, for us to quickly recover our balance and gauge its potential. It's an enormous accelerator, perhaps the greatest one since the plow, twelve thousand years ago. As an intelligence amplifier, it speeds up everything-including itself-and it continually improves because its heart is information or, more plainly, ideas. We can no more calculate its consequences than Babbage could have foreseen antibiotics, the Pill, or space stations.
       Further, the effects of those ideas are rapidly compounding, because a computer design is itself just a set of ideas. As we get better at manipulating ideas by building ever better computers, we get better at building even better computers-it's an ever-escalating upward spiral. The early nineteenth century, when the computer's story began, is already so far back that it may as well be the Stone Age. (Rawlins, 1997, p. 19)
       According to weak AI, the principle value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion than before. But according to strong AI the computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind; rather the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states. And according to strong AI, because the programmed computer has cognitive states, the programs are not mere tools that enable us to test psychological explanations; rather, the programs are themselves the explanations. (Searle, 1981b, p. 353)
       What makes people smarter than machines? They certainly are not quicker or more precise. Yet people are far better at perceiving objects in natural scenes and noting their relations, at understanding language and retrieving contextually appropriate information from memory, at making plans and carrying out contextually appropriate actions, and at a wide range of other natural cognitive tasks. People are also far better at learning to do these things more accurately and fluently through processing experience.
       What is the basis for these differences? One answer, perhaps the classic one we might expect from artificial intelligence, is "software." If we only had the right computer program, the argument goes, we might be able to capture the fluidity and adaptability of human information processing. Certainly this answer is partially correct. There have been great breakthroughs in our understanding of cognition as a result of the development of expressive high-level computer languages and powerful algorithms. However, we do not think that software is the whole story.
       In our view, people are smarter than today's computers because the brain employs a basic computational architecture that is more suited to deal with a central aspect of the natural information processing tasks that people are so good at.... hese tasks generally require the simultaneous consideration of many pieces of information or constraints. Each constraint may be imperfectly specified and ambiguous, yet each can play a potentially decisive role in determining the outcome of processing. (McClelland, Rumelhart & Hinton, 1986, pp. 3-4)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Computers

  • 18 Creativity

       Put in this bald way, these aims sound utopian. How utopian they areor rather, how imminent their realization-depends on how broadly or narrowly we interpret the term "creative." If we are willing to regard all human complex problem solving as creative, then-as we will point out-successful programs for problem solving mechanisms that simulate human problem solvers already exist, and a number of their general characteristics are known. If we reserve the term "creative" for activities like discovery of the special theory of relativity or the composition of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony, then no example of a creative mechanism exists at the present time. (Simon, 1979, pp. 144-145)
       Among the questions that can now be given preliminary answers in computational terms are the following: how can ideas from very different sources be spontaneously thought of together? how can two ideas be merged to produce a new structure, which shows the influence of both ancestor ideas without being a mere "cut-and-paste" combination? how can the mind be "primed," so that one will more easily notice serendipitous ideas? why may someone notice-and remember-something fairly uninteresting, if it occurs in an interesting context? how can a brief phrase conjure up an entire melody from memory? and how can we accept two ideas as similar ("love" and "prove" as rhyming, for instance) in respect of a feature not identical in both? The features of connectionist AI models that suggest answers to these questions are their powers of pattern completion, graceful degradation, sensitization, multiple constraint satisfaction, and "best-fit" equilibration.... Here, the important point is that the unconscious, "insightful," associative aspects of creativity can be explained-in outline, at least-by AI methods. (Boden, 1996, p. 273)
       There thus appears to be an underlying similarity in the process involved in creative innovation and social independence, with common traits and postures required for expression of both behaviors. The difference is one of product-literary, musical, artistic, theoretical products on the one hand, opinions on the other-rather than one of process. In both instances the individual must believe that his perceptions are meaningful and valid and be willing to rely upon his own interpretations. He must trust himself sufficiently that even when persons express opinions counter to his own he can proceed on the basis of his own perceptions and convictions. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 58)
       he average level of ego strength and emotional stability is noticeably higher among creative geniuses than among the general population, though it is possibly lower than among men of comparable intelligence and education who go into administrative and similar positions. High anxiety and excitability appear common (e.g. Priestley, Darwin, Kepler) but full-blown neurosis is quite rare. (Cattell & Butcher, 1970, p. 315)
       he insight that is supposed to be required for such work as discovery turns out to be synonymous with the familiar process of recognition; and other terms commonly used in the discussion of creative work-such terms as "judgment," "creativity," or even "genius"-appear to be wholly dispensable or to be definable, as insight is, in terms of mundane and well-understood concepts. (Simon, 1989, p. 376)
       From the sketch material still in existence, from the condition of the fragments, and from the autographs themselves we can draw definite conclusions about Mozart's creative process. To invent musical ideas he did not need any stimulation; they came to his mind "ready-made" and in polished form. In contrast to Beethoven, who made numerous attempts at shaping his musical ideas until he found the definitive formulation of a theme, Mozart's first inspiration has the stamp of finality. Any Mozart theme has completeness and unity; as a phenomenon it is a Gestalt. (Herzmann, 1964, p. 28)
       Great artists enlarge the limits of one's perception. Looking at the world through the eyes of Rembrandt or Tolstoy makes one able to perceive aspects of truth about the world which one could not have achieved without their aid. Freud believed that science was adaptive because it facilitated mastery of the external world; but was it not the case that many scientific theories, like works of art, also originated in phantasy? Certainly, reading accounts of scientific discovery by men of the calibre of Einstein compelled me to conclude that phantasy was not merely escapist, but a way of reaching new insights concerning the nature of reality. Scientific hypotheses require proof; works of art do not. Both are concerned with creating order, with making sense out of the world and our experience of it. (Storr, 1993, p. xii)
       The importance of self-esteem for creative expression appears to be almost beyond disproof. Without a high regard for himself the individual who is working in the frontiers of his field cannot trust himself to discriminate between the trivial and the significant. Without trust in his own powers the person seeking improved solutions or alternative theories has no basis for distinguishing the significant and profound innovation from the one that is merely different.... An essential component of the creative process, whether it be analysis, synthesis, or the development of a new perspective or more comprehensive theory, is the conviction that one's judgment in interpreting the events is to be trusted. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 59)
       In the daily stream of thought these four different stages [preparation; incubation; illumination or inspiration; and verification] constantly overlap each other as we explore different problems. An economist reading a Blue Book, a physiologist watching an experiment, or a business man going through his morning's letters, may at the same time be "incubating" on a problem which he proposed to himself a few days ago, be accumulating knowledge in "preparation" for a second problem, and be "verifying" his conclusions to a third problem. Even in exploring the same problem, the mind may be unconsciously incubating on one aspect of it, while it is consciously employed in preparing for or verifying another aspect. (Wallas, 1926, p. 81)
       he basic, bisociative pattern of the creative synthesis [is] the sudden interlocking of two previously unrelated skills, or matrices of thought. (Koestler, 1964, p. 121)
        11) The Earliest Stages in the Creative Process Involve a Commerce with Disorder
       Even to the creator himself, the earliest effort may seem to involve a commerce with disorder. For the creative order, which is an extension of life, is not an elaboration of the established, but a movement beyond the established, or at least a reorganization of it and often of elements not included in it. The first need is therefore to transcend the old order. Before any new order can be defined, the absolute power of the established, the hold upon us of what we know and are, must be broken. New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive that world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." (Ghiselin, 1985, p. 4)
       New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive our world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." Chaos and disorder are perhaps the wrong terms for that indeterminate fullness and activity of the inner life. For it is organic, dynamic, full of tension and tendency. What is absent from it, except in the decisive act of creation, is determination, fixity, and commitment to one resolution or another of the whole complex of its tensions. (Ghiselin, 1952, p. 13)
       [P]sychoanalysts have principally been concerned with the content of creative products, and with explaining content in terms of the artist's infantile past. They have paid less attention to examining why the artist chooses his particular activity to express, abreact or sublimate his emotions. In short, they have not made much distinction between art and neurosis; and, since the former is one of the blessings of mankind, whereas the latter is one of the curses, it seems a pity that they should not be better differentiated....
       Psychoanalysis, being fundamentally concerned with drive and motive, might have been expected to throw more light upon what impels the creative person that in fact it has. (Storr, 1993, pp. xvii, 3)
       A number of theoretical approaches were considered. Associative theory, as developed by Mednick (1962), gained some empirical support from the apparent validity of the Remote Associates Test, which was constructed on the basis of the theory.... Koestler's (1964) bisociative theory allows more complexity to mental organization than Mednick's associative theory, and postulates "associative contexts" or "frames of reference." He proposed that normal, non-creative, thought proceeds within particular contexts or frames and that the creative act involves linking together previously unconnected frames.... Simonton (1988) has developed associative notions further and explored the mathematical consequences of chance permutation of ideas....
       Like Koestler, Gruber (1980; Gruber and Davis, 1988) has based his analysis on case studies. He has focused especially on Darwin's development of the theory of evolution. Using piagetian notions, such as assimilation and accommodation, Gruber shows how Darwin's system of ideas changed very slowly over a period of many years. "Moments of insight," in Gruber's analysis, were the culminations of slow long-term processes.... Finally, the information-processing approach, as represented by Simon (1966) and Langley et al. (1987), was considered.... [Simon] points out the importance of good problem representations, both to ensure search is in an appropriate problem space and to aid in developing heuristic evaluations of possible research directions.... The work of Langley et al. (1987) demonstrates how such search processes, realized in computer programs, can indeed discover many basic laws of science from tables of raw data.... Boden (1990a, 1994) has stressed the importance of restructuring the problem space in creative work to develop new genres and paradigms in the arts and sciences. (Gilhooly, 1996, pp. 243-244; emphasis in original)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Creativity

  • 19 Theory

       Neurath has likened science to a boat which, if we are to rebuild it, we must rebuild plank by plank while staying afloat in it. The philosopher and the scientist are in the same boat....
       Analyze theory-building how we will, we all must start in the middle. Our conceptual firsts are middle-sized, middle-distanced objects, and our introduction to them and to everything comes midway in the cultural evolution of the race. In assimilating this cultural fare we are little more aware of a distinction between report and invention, substance and style, cues and conceptualization, than we are of a distinction between the proteins and the carbohydrates of our material intake. Retrospectively we may distinguish the components of theory-building, as we distinguish the proteins and carbohydrates while subsisting on them. (Quine, 1960, pp. 4-6)
       Theories are usually introduced when previous study of a class of phenomena has revealed a system of uniformities.... Theories then seek to explain those regularities and, generally, to afford a deeper and more accurate understanding of the phenomena in question. To this end, a theory construes those phenomena as manifestations of entities and processes that lie behind or beneath them, as it were. (Hempel, 1966, p. 70)
       A strong approach [to construct validation] looks on construct validation as tough-minded testing of specific hypotheses:
       heoretical concepts are defined conceptually or implicitly by their role in a network of nomological or statistical "laws." The meaning is partially given by the theoretical network, however tentative and as yet impoverished that network may be. Crudely put, you know what you mean by an entity to the extent that statements about it in the theoretical language are linked to statements in the observational language. These statements are about where it's found, what it does, what it's made of. Only a few of those properties are directly tied to observables [p. 136]. In [an early] theory sketch, based upon some experience and data, everything said is conjectural. We have tentative notions about some indicators of the construct with unknown validities [p. 144]. [When we check up empirically on predictions from the model] we are testing the crude theory sketch, we are tightening the network psychometrically, and we are validating the indicators. All of these are done simultaneously [p. 149]. [Extracted with elisions and some paraphrase from Meehl & Golden, 1982.] (Cronbach, 1990, p. 183)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Theory

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